Introduction

It is important to know how accurate professional forecasters predict macroeconomic indicators, because many households, financial market participants, and policy makers base their expectations on professional forecasts (Carroll, 2003; Croushore, 1993) . Thus, the evaluation of forecasters' misperception and disagreement gives additional information to decision makers about the relative accuracy and relevance of market expectations (Ciccarelli and Hubrich, 2010) . However, forecast evaluation also depends on the relevant target, i.e. whether forecasters aim at predicting the initial announcement or the finally revised value. Taking the target into account becomes more important if initially released announcements substantially differ from last-available releases due to data revisions (Aruoba, 2008) . Thus, accurate forecasts of latest-available figures may correspond to systematic misperceptions of initial announcements, if the latter are revised systematically, and vice versa. Therefore, when evaluating forecasts, data revisions should be taken into account (Croushore, 2011) .
Market participants carefully watch scheduled announcements of both the main indicators for economic activity (fundamentals) and monetary policy, because they potentially contain new information that is not incorporated into expectations of market participants. The resulting forecast errors ("news") affect financial markets and through a number of channels also the real economy (e.g., Basistha and Kurov, 2008) .
A large body of literature examines responses of financial market prices to the surprise component of major macroeconomic announcements and monetary policy releases (Andersson, Overby, and Sebestyén, 2009) . Several studies focus on the impact of monetary policy surprises on interest rates (Valente, 2009; Das, 2002; Ederington and Lee, 1993; Doukas and Melhem, 1986; Urich and Wachtel, 1984; Grossman, 1981) and more recently on global equity indexes (e.g., Wongswan, 2009), bond and stock markets (Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Andersson, 2007; Beber and Brandt, 2006; Deaves, 1990) , and foreign exchange rates (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2007; Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright, 2007; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003) .
Unexpected announcements of macroeconomic indicators and their revisions can have significant effects on future activity. Oh and Waldman (1990) find that expectational shocks measured by revisions of leading economic indicators explain a substantial part of the volatility in the growth rate of industrial production. They also show that magnitude of data revisions and of expectation errors regarding both the initial announcement and the revised data is studied. Moreover, disagreement among forecasters can be observed over time.
The organization of the paper is as follows: A detailed description of the data is provided in Section 2. Data revisions and forecast accuracy are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 assess the impact of economic conditions on revisions, surprises, and disagreement among forecasters. Expectations formation is discussed in Section 6.
Finally, the findings are summarized in Section 7.
Data 7 price and volatile stock markets. Following the NBER definition there were two recessions in the U.S. during the period 1999 : 01/2001 -11/2001 and 12/2007 -06/2009 (NBER, 2008 . From the CEPR definition it follows that the Eurozone was in a recession from 01/2008 01/ until 04/2009 01/ (CEPR, 2013 . Since there is no official definition for recessions in Germany, with the kind permission of the Deutsche Bundesbank, its internal definition is used. Therefore, Germany experienced two recessions during the considered period 1999-2010: 04/2000-06/2003 and 01/2008-03/2009 . Data on the oil price and on volatility indices are from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Based on the respective equity market, three volatility indices are used for the USA, the Eurozone, and Germany. indicators and 24 (25) forecasts on average for European (German) indicators. Table 1 summarizes the number of announcements that were released for each indicator during the sample period, the official announcement frequency, the total number of forecasts, and the minimum, maximum and average number of forecasts as well as the standard deviation of participating economists per indicator. By far most announcements (618) were released for Initial Jobless Claims, since these figures are announced weekly. Therefore, although on average only 34 economists participate in this survey, the total number of forecasts for the whole period 1999-2010 is very high (20,865 estimates).
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Since data is rarely available for European and German indicators for the period 1999-2002, the total number of announcements is much higher for U.S. indicators (3, 988) .
5 Based on the DAX, the implied volatility of the German equity market is measured by VDAX-NEW. The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, and VSTOXX assesses the implied volatility of the EuroStoxx50. 6 In the following, institutions and economists are are used interchangeably. indicators and 24 (25) forecasts on average for European (German) indicators. Table 1 summarizes the number of announcements that were released for each indicator during the sample period, the official announcement frequency, the total number of forecasts, and the minimum, maximum and average number of forecasts as well as the standard deviation of participating economists per indicator. By far most announcements (618) were released for Initial Jobless Claims, since these figures are announced weekly. Therefore, although on average only 34 economists participate in this survey, the total number of forecasts for the whole period 1999-2010 is very high (20,865 estimates).
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Hence, the total number of released forecasts for U.S. indicators (198, 791) is much higher than the number of estimates for European and German indicators, both be- Hence, the total number of released forecasts for U. S. indicators (198,791) According to decision requirements (i.e. whether real-time announcements or revised figures are relevant in reaching a decision), the fact that some releases are subject to considerably large revisions should be considered both by forecasters and by policymakers. This is important because if, for example, economists attempt to forecast the initial release, they will underestimate the latest revision the more the initial announcement is revised upwards, and vice versa. In contrast, if, ceteris paribus, economists are attempting to forecast the latest revision, they will overestimate the initial announcement. On that account, first of all it is investigated whether indicators are subject to significant revisions, implying that revised figures are significantly different from initial announcements on average. This is analyzed using the following regression:
In a second step, the significance of economists' median forecast errors with respect to initial releases (A i,t ), first revisions (R F i,t ) and latest-available figures (R L i,t ) are analyzed using the following specifications 7 :
7 All regressions were also run with average expectations, however results do not differ much (results are available upon request).
The relationship between misperceptions and revisions N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 10 3
where A i,t is the initial announcement for indicator i at release date t, E i,t is the median expectation, t is the error term and y ∈ {R (Croushore, 2011) , the left panel of Table 2 . Summary statistics for the rest of the indicators are available from the author.
9 The latest-available value reflects the value available at the time when the data was collected from Bloomberg (March, 2011) .
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Testing for Systematic Revisions and Forecast Errors
To assess whether initial announcements are biased forecasts of subsequent revisions, the latter are classified into two categories (see Croushore, 2011; Aruoba, 2008; Mankiw and Shapiro, 1986; Mankiw, Runkle, and Shapiro, 1984) The following regressions are considered to distinguish between revisions as noise or news:
The relationship between misperceptions and revisions
where A i,t is the initial release for indicator i at release date t, R L i,t is the corresponding last-available revision, and is a white noise error term. The noise hypothesis is tested by implementing a Wald test for the joint hypothesis H 0 : α 3 = 0, β 3 = 1, and the news hypothesis by the joint hypothesis H 0 : α 4 = 0, β 4 = 1. and are therefore predictable with the information set available at the time the initial release was announced. However, it must be noted that although most indicators fail both Wald tests, which means that initial announcements are biased forecasts of the true values, this framework provides no guidance if both hypotheses are rejected. This holds especially when the unconditional mean of revisions is not equal to zero (Aruoba, 2008 Although the previous analysis has shown that data is partially significantly revised, it is not clear a priori whether economists are attempting to forecast the initial release or the latest-revised figures. Therefore, economists' misperceptions vis-à-vis the initial announcement as well as vis-à-vis the latest revision are to be examined next. The empirical approach equals the common test of expectation unbiasedness (e.g. see Urich and Wachtel, 1984; Fildes and Stekler, 2002; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2003) : The rational expectations hypothesis implies that the released and the expected values must 12
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where A i,t , is the initial announcement for indicator i at release date t, E A i,t is the corresponding median expectation, and i,t is a white noise disturbance term. Accordingly, expectations regarding the latest revision E RL i,t are unbiased if the joint null hypothesis H 0 : (α, β) = (0, 1) cannot be rejected for The results of the forecast and revision analyses also point to some country-specific 10 Unbiasedness is a necessary condition for partial rationality, which means that information is used efficiently (Brown and Maital, 1981) .
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where
is the initial announcement for indicator i at release date t, E
A i,t is the corresponding median expectation, and i,t is a white noise disturbance term. Accordingly, expectations regarding the latest revision E RL i,t are unbiased if the joint null hypothesis [Insert Table 4 about here.]
The results of the forecast and revision analyses also point to some country-specific 10 Unbiasedness is a necessary condition for partial rationality, which means that information is used efficiently (Brown and Maital, 1981) . Table 4 ) differ from findings regarding U.S. and European indicators: Although most German indicators are systematically revised from the initial announcement to the latest revision (see Table 3 ), the evaluation of the corresponding forecasts with respect to the latest revisions suggests that forecasters that are (assumingly) aiming to predict the latest revisions for certain indicators are
The relationship between misperceptions and revisions N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 14 3 differences. For instance, the median forecast is biased regarding the final values for Table 4 ) differ from findings regarding U.S.
and European indicators: Although most German indicators are systematically revised from the initial announcement to the latest revision (see Table 3 ), the evaluation of the corresponding forecasts with respect to the latest revisions suggests that forecasters that are (assumingly) aiming to predict the latest revisions for certain indicators are able to form better forecasts if these indicators are revised systematically. Though to a lower extent, this relationship is also observable regarding U.S. indicators. Therefore, when evaluating forecast accuracy, decision makers should take into account whether announcements are revised systematically and whether economists aim at forecasting the initial release or the latest revision.
The Impact of Economic Conditions on Revisions and Surprises
The previous analysis has shown that some releases are revised systematically and that these revisions are also economically significant. 
where A i,t is the initially announced value of indicator i, R In order to examine the impact of current economic conditions on revisions, the 11 As measured by the respective volatility index, as described in section 2 12 The threshold is 1.65 standard deviations above the mean, which corresponds to the 5% one-tailed significance level. Each month is treated as an independent observation. Calculation is based on the period 2002-2010.
4 The Impact of Economic Conditions on Revisions and Surprises
The previous analysis has shown that some releases are revised systematically and that these revisions are also economically significant. The following specification investigates the impact of economic conditions (recessions, highly volatile stock markets, and a high oil price) on data revisions. Since announcements that are released at release date t refer to a reporting period (rp) that for most indicators differs from the release date (t = rp), economic conditions during the reporting period are presumed to impact later revisions. Hence, dummy variables are constructed for each country in the following manner: Following the methodology in Bloom (2009) indicators are constructed to take a value of 1 if stock markets are highly volatile (the oil price is significantly high), and zero otherwise. Stock markets (the oil price) are defined to be highly volatile at release date t and reporting period rp respectively if the peak of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended (λ = 129, 600) implied volatility 11 (oil price) significantly exceeds the mean.
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Due to different units across the considered indicators, standardized revisions and forecast errors (revisions and surprises are divided by their respective sample standard deviations) are used to facilitate interpretation. Standardized revisions and surprises associated with indicator i at time t are defined as
The Impact of Economic Conditions on Revisions and Surprises
N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 16 4 following specification is used for each indicator i:
The In general, the hypothesis of economic conditions during reporting periods being better able to explain revisions or surprises is not confirmed; the economic situation at release time seems to have a stronger impact on experts' forecast errors and data revisions than economic condition during the reporting period. The analysis also points to a significant interlinkage between the economies. For instance, forecasters are less surprised about the initial announcement for US GDP if the S&P 500 has been volatile during the reporting period. At the same time, the corresponding median forecast error increases if the Eurozone economy has experienced a recession during that period. 
Previous results have shown that economic conditions both during the reporting period and at the time of the announcement have an impact on data revisions and on experts' forecast errors. Thus, the following analysis of disagreement among forecasters takes into account both influencing factors but concentrates on "domestic" factors only;
e.g., dummy variables indicating U.S. recessions, a volatile S&P 500 and a high oil price both during the reporting period (rp) and at release time (t) enter the regressions for U.S. indicators. Therefore, for each indicator i for country C (C ∈ {US, EU, DE}) the following regression is estimated:
where σ C i,t is the standard deviation of individual forecasts for indicator i for country C at release date t, and i,t is the error term. In order to capture how foreign economic conditions are related to disagreement, two different specifications are used: First, the impact of economic conditions at the 13 Indicators for which the reporting period coincides with the release period are not considered in this specification due to collinearity.
14 A negative coefficient implies reduced disagreement, and vice versa.
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time when releases are published is analyzed using the following specification:
Second, the effect of the economic situation during the reporting period is assessed by estimating the following regression:
where σ i,t is the standard deviation of individual forecasts for indicator i and release
Determinants of Disagreement N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 20 5 time when releases are published is analyzed using the following specification:
Second, the effect of the economic situation during the reporting period is assessed by estimating the following regression: 
where σ i,t is the standard deviation of individual forecasts for indicator i and release time t.
Since results are similar for both regressions (10) Second, the effect of the economic situation during the reporting period is assessed by estimating the following regression:
Since results are similar for both regressions 
Expectations Formation
Section 3 has shown that professional forecasters on average under-or overestimate some indicators and that most estimates are biased. This section aims at analyzing the expectations formation process underlying professional forecasts. Dovern and Weisser (2011) point out that forecast accuracy is assumed to be the only objective of forecasters and that only true expectations are published. Although forecasters might also e.g. want to gain maximal public attention, which would provide an incentive to over-or underestimate outcomes, such arguments have little weight due to the revealed identities of the panelists in the data set used for this analysis. DeCanio (1979) argues that "rational expectations" as defined by Muth (1961) require unreasonably high costs if a forecaster is to collect all necessary information. Recent models of expectations formation consider that after weighing costs and benefits, agents rationally decide to restrict their information set to information they are likely to acquire (Demery and Duck, 2007) . Following DeCanio (1979) , the operational significance of the rational expectations idea can be improved by specifying some methods of learning. For example, an error-learning model as in Gramlich (1983) could be applied.
Since (adaptive) learning also implies more persistent data than models with rational expectations, the former is used in forward-looking models (Chevillon, Massmann, and Mavroeidis, 2010) .
In this study two expectations formation hypotheses are tested that are mostly used in the literature on expectations formation (see e.g., Hafer, 1983; Tanzi, 1980; Turnovsky, 1970; Muth, 1961) : The extrapolative and the adaptive hypothesis. The extrapolative hypothesis is based on the estimation of
where E i,t is the median forecast for indicator i at time t (which is formed between t − 1 and t); A i,t−1 is the announced growth rate of indicator i in t − 1, the term (A i,t−1 − A i,t−2 ) corresponds to the trend in growth rates during the previous period, and i,t is a white noise error term. The original version of this hypothesis is consistent with the analysis in Section 3 and stipulates H 0 = (α, β 1 = 0, 1). In case H 0 : β 2 > 0 is not rejected, forecasters are expecting the past trend to continue and hence are Expectations Formation N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
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extrapolating the past trend. In contrast, not rejecting H 0 : β 2 < 0 corresponds to forecasters' expectations being regressive, i.e. they expect the past trend to reverse itself, whereas H 0 : (α = β 2 = 0, β 1 = 1) is related to static expectations.
The adaptive hypothesis assumes that when forming expectations, forecasters add a fraction of their latest forecast error to their latest forecast (see also e.g. Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981; Carlson and Parkin, 1975) :
However, this formulation implies that if there is a trend in the announced growth rates, forecasters systematically underestimate the actual announcement in t. This is accounted for by estimating
which is equivalent to Equation 13 for almost all indicators (see columns 1 and 2), and forecasters never expect trends to be static (see column 6). Column 12 in the right hand side panel of Table 7 shows the results for adaptive expectations. For all indicators, apart from the Eurozone unemployment rate, forecasters expect reversed trends in the announced growth rates so that they lower their forecasts.
[Insert Table 7 about here.]
The same analysis is also done for expectations concerning latest-available releases
Expectations Formation 6 that they lower their forecasts.
The same analysis is also done for expectations concerning latest-available releases (results not reported). In general, the formation process of expectations for the latest revision does not differ from expectations formation concerning the initial announcement. However, forecasters seem to change their expectations formation about the European unemployment rate when forecasting the latest revisions. While forecasters extrapolate the trend in initial announcements, they expect a regressing trend in the latest revisions. Similarly, when testing the adaptive hypothesis, the analysis using the latest revisions shows that, in contrast to the initial announcement, forecasters expect the latest revision to follow the previous trend and therefore they raise their expectations.
Concluding Remarks
N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d Expectations formation regarding latest revisions is generally found not to differ from expectations formation concerning initial announcements. Further research, using this data set as a panel, would allow investigating whether the assumption is reliable that forecast accuracy is the only objective of forecasters and that only true expectations are published. Moreover, the information transmission process could be investigated.
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